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1. Introduction  
Recently, the principle known as “Ought Implies Can” (henceforth, OIC, for short), according to 
which a person ought to do something only if she can do it, has received some attention from 
experimental philosophers. First, in a paper (Mizrahi 2015a) and then a reply to commentators 
(Mizrahi 2015b), Mizrahi reports the results of two experimental studies which show that people 
attribute moral obligation to agents even when they also judge that those agents cannot perform 
the requisite action. (Cf. Kurthy and Lawford-Smith 2015.) Second, Buckwalter and Turri (2015) 
present evidence that corroborates Mizrahi’s findings as well as suggest that attributions of 
blame are sensitive to considerations of ability (or lack of ability). As Buckwalter and Turri 
(2015, p. 14) put it, “commonsense morality rejects [OIC and accepts] a ‘blame implies can’ 
principle.” Finally, Chituc et al. (2016) present further evidence that is consistent with the 
aforementioned findings. They even go so far as to claim that their results amount to “an 
empirical refutation” of OIC (Henne et al. 2016).1 
Despite the fact that the results of their experiments are in agreement, insofar as all of 
them show that participants judge that agents ought to do something even when they also judge 
that those agents cannot do it, Mizrahi (2015a, 2015b), Buckwalter and Turri (2015), and Chituc 
et al. (2016) draw different conclusions from these findings. Mizrahi (2015a, p. 234) sets out to 
test “the alleged intuitiveness” of OIC. For him, then, the fact that participants attribute moral 
obligations to agents who are unable to do what they ought to shows that “OIC is not intuitive” 
(Mizrahi 2015b, p. 251). For “If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many 
philosophers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge that agents who are unable to 
perform an action are not morally obligated to perform that action” (Mizrahi 2015a, p. 239). 
                                               
1 For non-empirical arguments concerning OIC, see Graham (2011). Cf. Littlejohn (2012). On OIC from an 
epistemic point of view, see Mizrahi (2012). 
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Since what we find is that people judge the agents who are unable to perform an action are still 
morally obligated to perform that action, it follows that OIC is not intuitive. The upshot, for 
Mizrahi (2015b, p. 254), is that “OIC can no longer be taken as axiomatic; it must be argued for 
without appealing to intuitions.” 
Unlike Mizrahi, Buckwalter and Turri (2015) set out to test the hypothesis that ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’, i.e., that OIC is true, not the hypothesis that OIC is intuitive. For this reason, they 
take their results to be showing that “Commonsense moral cognition rejects the principle that 
ought implies can” (Buckwalter and Turri 2015, p. 16). They add that “Moral obligations persist 
with or without ability” (Buckwalter and Turri 2015, p. 16), as opposed to judgments about 
moral obligations and (in)ability, thereby suggesting that they take their results to be showing 
that it is not the case that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Taking their results to show that “ought does not 
imply can” (Buckwalter and Turri 2015, p. 14), Buckwalter and Turri then wonder whether 
“blame implies can.” They take the results of their experiments to show that, “although ordinary 
moral cognition does not endorse an ‘ought implies can’ principle, it may support a closely 
related principle, namely ‘blame implies can’” (Buckwalter and Turri 2015, p. 15). 
Like Buckwalter and Turri (2015), Chituc et al. (2016) also set out to test the semantic 
properties of OIC rather than the hypothesis that OIC is intuitive. In particular, they set out to 
test the hypothesis that “‘ought’ analytically or conceptually implies ‘can’” (Chituc et al. 2016, 
p. 21). As Chituc et al. (2016, p. 20) explain, to say that “‘ought’ analytically or conceptually 
implies ‘can’” (Chituc et al. 2016, p. 21) is to say that “‘ought’ is supposed to imply ‘can’ by 
virtue of the concepts expressed by the words ‘ought’ and ‘can’, just as ‘bachelor’ implies ‘male’ 
by virtue of the concepts expressed by the words ‘bachelor’ and ‘male’” (Chituc et al. 2016, p. 
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20).2 For this reason, they say that “[OIC] is supposed to follow necessarily from the concepts 
expressed by the words ‘ought’ and ‘can’” and claim that their “results show that it does not” 
(Chituc et al. 2016, p. 23). In fact, they even refer to their findings as an “empirical refutation” of 
OIC, claim that “OIC is not true analytically or conceptually” (Henne et al. 2016, p. 288), and 
“propose the end of OIC as it is traditionally understood” (Henne et al. 2016, p. 289). Their 
claim to have refuted OIC has even received some attention in popular media, with an article in 
The New York Times’ Sunday Review, entitled “The Data against Kant” (Chituc and Henne 
2016). The hypotheses and predictions of the three experimental studies on OIC discussed above 
are summed up in Table 1. 
Table 1. Hypotheses and predictions of the aforementioned experimental studies on OIC. 
Study Hypothesis Prediction 
Mizrahi 
(2015a) 
OIC is 
intuitive 
“If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many 
philosophers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge 
that agents who are unable to perform an action are not morally 
obligated to perform that action” (Mizrahi 2015a, p. 232). 
Buckwalter 
and Turri 
(2015) 
OIC is true “Our primary question is whether perceptions of ability limit 
judgments about whether a broad range of moral requirements 
are present, or if moral requirements are attributed to agents 
independently of the presence of an ability to fulfill them” 
(Buckwalter and Turri 2015, p. 2). 
Chituc et al. 
(2016) 
OIC is 
analytic 
“If ‘ought’ analytically or conceptually implies ‘can’, [...] then 
participants should deny that the agent ‘ought’ to do something if 
they learn that the agent can’t do it” (Chituc et al. 2016, p. 21). 
                                               
2 Even before experimental philosophers started testing OIC empirically, it should have been quite clear that OIC 
can no longer be “treated as an axiom” (Howard-Snyder 2013). This is because there are at least three candidates for 
the supposed relation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ (see Howard-Snyder 2013; Mizrahi 2009; Mizrahi 2015a). The first 
candidate is logical implication, i.e., entailment. The fact that “‘ought’ entails ‘can’” is open to counterexamples 
(see, e.g., Mizrahi 2009 and King 2014), however, has led many to abandon it as the relation between ‘ought’ and 
‘can’ and propose two other candidates: presupposition (Hare 1951) and conversational implicature (Sinnott-
Armstrong 1984). These two candidates for the relation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ are also open to counterexamples 
(see, e.g., Mizrahi 2009 and King forthcoming), however, and so it is far from clear how ‘ought’ is supposed to 
imply ‘can’. As an anonymous reviewer helpfully pointed out, there are also systems of deontic logic that do not 
treat OIC as an axiom. See Saka (2000) for modal arguments against OIC. See also Martin (2009). For more on 
deontic logic and OIC, see Part I of Tessman (2015). 
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In this paper, we seek to contribute to this ongoing debate about the status of OIC and the 
growing body of empirical evidence that undermines it by (a) reporting the results of our own 
experimental survey of judgments about ability and moral obligation, and (b) trying to adjudicate 
between the different conclusions that can be drawn from such empirical findings. Our results 
indeed show that people do judge that agents are morally obligated to perform an action even 
when they also judge that those agents cannot perform the action. Our results also show that 
people’s moral judgments (i.e., judgments about what agents ought to do) exhibit an actor-
observer effect,3 as we might expect from previous experimental studies in moral psychology 
and experimental philosophy. For this reason, we argue, the empirical fact that people attribute 
moral obligation to unable agents cannot be taken as “a powerful counterexample to” 
(Buckwalter and Turri 2015, p. 5) or an “empirical refutation” (Chituc et al. 2016; Henne et al. 
2016) of OIC. 
 
2.Study 
2a. Methods 
Our study was designed to test people’s intuitive judgments about cases of moral obligation 
(ought) and ability (can). In order to adjudicate between the aforementioned conclusions drawn 
from the empirical evidence on OIC, namely, whether the fact that people attribute moral 
obligation to agents who are unable to perform the requisite action constitutes an “empirical 
refutation” of OIC, as Chituc et al. (2016) contend, a “powerful counterexample to OIC,” as 
Buckwalter and Turri (2015, p. 5) contend, or evidence that OIC is not as intuitive as 
                                               
3 Buckwalter and Turri (2015) also tested for framing effects, but Chituc et al. (2016) did not. We will say more on 
this in Section 2c. 
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philosophers commonly think, as Mizrahi (2015b) contends (see Table 1), we manipulated the 
following variables: 
Circumstances (Able/Unable): We gave some participants vignettes in which the agent is 
able to perform an action and other participants vignettes in which the agent is unable to 
perform an action. 
Agent (Alex/You): We gave some participants vignettes in which they are observers (the 
agent is “Alex”) and other participants vignettes in which they are actors (the agent is 
“You”). 
Participants for this study were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and were tested 
through Qualtrics, an online survey platform. They were compensated $0.15 for approximately 
two minutes of their time. A total of 1,084 participants were recruited for this study. Of this 
sample, 3 participants were excluded because they did not consent to the informed agreement 
and 11 participants were excluded for not completing the questionnaire. This resulted in a sample 
of 1,070 total participants. Although demographics had no statistical effects, it is worth noting 
that our sample was extremely diverse, with participants (ages 18-65) claiming at least three 
different genders (624 men, 433 women, and 6 other), 17 different ethnic backgrounds, and 25 
distinct religious affiliations. 
After they were given written informed consent, participants were randomly given one 
vignette in a between-subjects experimental design that read as follows: 
You are [/Alex is] on a train. A person with a broken leg who uses crutches to walk 
boards the train. You remain [/Alex remains] seated even though there are no available 
seats on the train. 
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In the vignettes in which the agent is unable to perform the action (i.e., the agent is unable to 
give up a seat on a train for a disabled person), the second sentence read as follows: 
You are [/Alex is] sleeping and remain[/s] seated even though there are no available seats 
on the train. 
After reading one of the vignettes, participants were randomly assigned to one of the following 
statements and asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with them on a standard Likert 
scale from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly Agree”): 
1. You [/Alex] can give up the seat. 
2. You [/Alex] ought to give up the seat. 
We have chosen a between-subject design, randomly assigning each participant to a vignette 
with one of the above statements, in order to avoid interference between the conditions and so 
make our results more generalizable. After indicating their agreement or disagreement with one 
of these statements, participants were asked to complete a brief demographics questionnaire.  
2b. Results 
Likert-type data, like the kind we collected, is ordinal data. This means that the values assigned 
(1-7) have an order but the distances between values are not equal intervals.4 Therefore, Likert-
type data requires a special type of analysis. To begin with, we looked at the descriptive statistics 
and graphical representations of the data. This allows us to see the central tendencies in the data 
and which groups differ the most.5 Ordinal data cannot be described using averages because 
                                               
4 See Knapp (1990) for an overview of the controversy about treating ordinal data as interval data. 
5 We have chosen not to dichotomize the data into agree/disagree because we are interested in the strength of 
agreement as well as the polarity. The strength itself will also tell us which classification judgments would be in. So 
if the judgment is left as a 7 and not a binary choice, we know it is a strong “ought” judgment and we still know it 
was agreement with “ought.” But if we dichotomize, all we could know is that it was agreement with “ought.” For 
more on the problems with dichotomization, see MacCallum et al. (2002). 
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there is no meaning for a result that falls between two values. Instead, we look at medians, 
modes, frequencies, and quartiles. The best graphical representation of this is boxplots.6 
Figure 1 shows the data for judgments about “can” statements (namely, “You/Alex can 
give up the seat”). We can see the data are heavily skewed toward “strongly agree” for the 
vignettes in which the agent (either “You” or “Alex”) is able and more toward “somewhat agree” 
for the vignettes in which the agent (either “You” or “Alex”) is unable. Both the median and 
mode for the vignettes in which the agent (“You”) is able are 7 indicating that the most common 
judgment and the central tendency of the sample are both strong agreement. Vignettes in which 
the agent (“You”) is unable have a median of 5 and a mode of 7; so the central tendency is 
“somewhat agree” while the most common judgment is “strongly agree.” Vignettes in which the 
agent (“Alex”) is able have both a median and mode of 6. This indicates that the central tendency 
and most common judgment are ones of agreement. For the vignettes in which the agent 
(“Alex”) is unable, the median is 5 and the mode is 6, again highlighting levels of agreement in 
both statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6 We mention all of this in detail in order to explain our statistical choices, which throughout this paper will include 
less common but more specialized testing. We want to make sure that readers are able to reproduce or replicate our 
results. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of agreement with “can” statements.  
 
 
The data for judgments about “ought” statements (namely, “You/Alex ought to give up 
the seat”) show a somewhat different result (see Figure 2). The results are mainly homogeneous 
between groups. Overall, participants agree with the “ought” statements (namely, “You/Alex 
ought to give up the seat”). The central tendencies for vignettes in which the agent (“You”) is 
able, the agent (“You”) is unable, and the agent (“Alex”) is able are all 6 for agreement. The 
median for vignettes in which the agent (“Alex”) is unable is slightly lower at 5 for “somewhat 
agree.” The most common judgment for vignettes in which the agent (either “You” or “Alex”) is 
unable is 6 for “agree,” whereas the most common judgment for vignettes in which the agent 
(either “You” or “Alex”) is able is 7 for “strongly agree.” 
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Figure 2. Distribution of agreement with “ought” statements.  
 
  
  Graphical analyses and descriptive statistics, while useful for understanding the data’s 
distribution, cannot give us robust information about significant effects. Because means and 
variances are meaningless for ordinal data, ANOVA and similar measures of variance are 
inappropriate. We chose to perform an Aligned Rank Transform (ART) on the data.7 This 
transform produces statistics from the ordinal data on which regular ANOVA tests can be 
performed and analyzed in the usual way. From this method we were able to identify what 
factors had significant effects on “can” and “ought” statements. 
Agreement with “can” statements is significantly affected by circumstances (p = 4.11 x 
10-05) but not agent or interaction. Both circumstances (p = 6.19 x 10-05) and agent (p = 0.017) 
have significant effects on agreement with “ought” statements but interaction effects were 
                                               
7  As common as ANOVA and other interval/ratio tests are in testing Likert data, it is not an appropriate choice and 
will often lead to erroneous results. For a detailed explanation of ART procedures, see Wobbrock et al.. (2011). We 
performed the statistical analysis in R using the ARTool package provided by Wobbrock et al.. An overview of the 
tool and package can be accessed at https://depts.washington.edu/aimgroup/proj/art/. 
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insignificant. As we mentioned earlier, we did not find demographic factors such as religion, 
gender, and education to have significant effects on responses. 
Knowing that the interaction did not significantly affect agreement with “can” and 
“ought” statements, we are able to separate the groups and look at single factor ordinal analyses 
to test other hypotheses. In line with the experimental studies on OIC discussed in Section 1, we 
would like to see whether participants disagree with the statement “You/Alex ought to give up 
the seat” when the circumstances make the agent (either “You” or “Alex”) unable to give up the 
seat. To test this, we performed Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests. These tests are appropriate for ordinal 
data like ours. They test the null hypothesis “true location shift is equal to 0” between two groups 
in a between-subjects design. When the null hypothesis is rejected, we can say that one group has 
a shift greater or less than 0 when compared to the other group. The location considered for this 
test is the central tendency, or median. 
In the vignettes in which the agent is “You,” there is no shift in location based on ability 
(p = 0.117). In the vignettes in which the agent is “Alex,” there is a shift in location based on 
ability (p = 2.19 x 10-4). Based on a one-tailed test, we determined that the shift is greater than 0 
(p = 1.10 x 10-04) indicating that participants tend to agree more with “Alex ought to give up the 
seat” if Alex is able than if Alex is unable. The median is 6 for all cases except when Alex is 
unable; in that case, it is 5. So, overall participants still agree that the agent (either “You” or 
“Alex”) ought to do something even when the agent is unable to do it. 
We also investigated the actor-observer effect we mentioned above by comparing data 
where the agent is “Alex” with data where the agent is “You.” This was done using Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum tests as well. In the vignettes where the agent is able, change in agent caused no shift 
in location (p = 0.656). In the vignettes where the agent is unable, however, there was a 
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significant shift in location (p = 0.011). Using a one-tailed test, we were able to determine that 
the shift is greater than 0 (p = 0.005), which indicated that participants are more likely to make 
“ought” judgments for “You” than for “Alex” when both are unable. 
This actor-observer effect revealed something important about the way people make 
moral judgments. That is, it suggests that there is a significant difference between the way people 
judge moral statements about others, like “Alex ought to give up the seat,” and the way they 
judge moral statements about themselves, like “You ought to give up the seat.” As we know from 
previous studies in moral psychology and experimental philosophy, people’s moral judgments 
are affected by biases and factors that are supposed to be irrelevant to the truth or falsity of such 
moral judgments. As Buckwalter himself puts it: 
[Research in social psychology and experimental philosophy] has shown that ordinary 
people’s moral intuitions are influenced by a variety of factors including order effects 
[…], framing effects […], and environmental variables […]. Since it is widely agreed that 
those factors are irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the intuition, these empirical results 
cast doubt on the use of intuition as evidence for moral claims (Tobia et al. 2013, p. 630). 
For instance, the point of view from which hypothetical scenarios about morality (e.g., the trolley 
problem) are presented is supposed to be irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the judgments people 
make about those scenarios. So, if it is morally wrong to push the large person off the bridge in 
order to save the lives of five workers over the life of one worker on the tracks, then, from a 
moral point of view, it should not matter whether the “push” scenario is presented from the point 
of view of an actor or an observer. If the point of view does make a difference, as researchers 
have found (see, e.g., Nadelhoffer and Feltz 2008), then that is a reason to question the reliability 
of such moral judgments. Similarly, our data show that whether a scenario is described from the 
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point of view of an actor (in our study, these are the vignettes in which the agent is “You”) or 
from the point of view of an observer (in our study, these are the vignettes in which the agent is 
“Alex”) does make a difference to the moral judgments people make about these scenarios. 
Therefore, the results of our study provide reasons to question the reliability of such intuitive 
moral judgments, specifically, “ought” judgments, as evidence for or against philosophical theses 
(like OIC). 
To sum up, our main findings are that people judge that agents ought to do something 
even when they also judge that those agents can’t do it and that people’s “ought” judgments 
exhibit an actor-observer effect. That is to say, there is a significant difference between the way 
people make moral judgments about what moral agents ought to do when those judgments are 
about someone else (“Alex”) than when they are about themselves (“You”). In the next section, 
we discuss whether these findings amount to a counterexample to OIC, as Buckwalter and Turri 
(2015) contend, refute OIC, as Chituc et al. (2016) contend, or show that OIC is not intuitive, as 
Mizrahi (2015b) contends. 
2c. Discussion 
Although our findings are in line with the results reported by Mizrahi (2015a), Mizrahi (2015b), 
Buckwalter and Turri (2015), and Chituc et al. (2016), namely, that people’s attributions of 
moral obligations are not sensitive to the ability (or inability) of the moral agent in question, they 
do raise an important, but hitherto overlooked in the context of the debate over OIC, 
methodological concern. The worry is about the use of intuitive moral judgments as evidence for 
and against philosophical theses like OIC. As we know from previous studies in moral 
psychology and experimental philosophy, people’s judgments are affected by factors that are 
supposed to be irrelevant to the truth or falsity of those judgments. As Sinnott-Armstrong (2006, 
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p. 354) himself puts it: “Framing effects distort moral beliefs in so many cases that moral 
believers need confirmation for any particular moral belief.” 
For instance, several studies have shown that people’s moral judgments are subject to 
order effects (see, e.g., Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012). Presumably, the order in which 
hypothetical scenarios about morality (e.g., the trolley problem) are presented is supposed to be 
irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the judgments people make about those scenarios. So, if it is 
morally wrong to push the large person off the bridge in order to save the lives of five workers 
over the life of one worker on the tracks, then, from a moral point of view, it should not matter 
whether the “push” scenario is presented before or after the “switch” scenario. If the order of 
presentation does make a difference, as researchers have found (see, e.g., Schwitzgebel and 
Cushman 2012), then that is a reason to question the reliability of such intuitive moral 
judgments. Other studies have found that even the judgments of experts (e.g., professional 
philosophers) are not immune to order effects, framing effects, and other sorts of biases (see, 
e.g., Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2015). This has led many experimental philosophers to 
conclude that the evidential status of intuitive moral judgments in response to hypothetical 
scenarios (or “intuitions”) is questionable (see, e.g., Stich and Tobia 2016, pp. 5-21 and Mizrahi 
2015c).8 
Now, like the other experimental studies on OIC mentioned above, our experimental 
survey asks participants to make intuitive moral judgments; that is, intuitive judgments about 
what agents ought to (or ought not) do. As is known by now, however, such intuitive moral 
judgments are affected by all sorts of biases and factors that are irrelevant to the truth or falsity 
of those judgments. So we should not be surprised if we find that people's “ought” judgments are 
affected in similar ways. Indeed, as we reported in Section 2b, that is precisely what we have 
                                               
8 For more on intuitions and experimental philosophy, see Andow (2016a) and (2016b). 
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found. That is, participants’ “ought” judgments show an actor-observer effect. But this means 
that the evidential status of these intuitive moral judgments is doubtful. And yet that is precisely 
what Buckwalter and Turri (2015), and Chituc et al. (2016), want to do; that is, they want to use 
intuitive moral judgments as conclusive evidence against a philosophical thesis. More 
specifically, Buckwalter and Turri (2015) want to use “ought” judgments as conclusive evidence 
against or, as they put it, “a powerful counterexample to OIC” (Buckwalter and Turri 2015, p. 5); 
that is, against the philosophical principle itself, not how people think about what the principle 
states. Chituc et al. (2016) even go so far as to say that the empirical fact that people attribute 
moral obligation to agents who are unable to perform the obligatory action constitutes an 
“empirical refutation” of OIC. That is problematic, however, given the fact that intuitive moral 
judgments are influenced by biases and other irrelevant factors. As experimental philosophers, 
Buckwalter, Turri, and Chituc et al. ought to know better. 
Indeed, Buckwalter and Turri (2015) have themselves tested whether or not “ought” 
judgments are affected by perspective, i.e., by whether a vignette is presented from a first-person 
point of view (where the participant is an actor) or a third-person point of view (where the 
participant is an observer). Buckwalter and Turri (2015, p. 7) report that “[p]articipants in the 
Actor conditions were more likely to select [the “Obligated but Unable”] response than 
participants in Observer conditions.” But this only makes their attempt to use intuitive moral 
judgments as evidence that “ought does not imply can” (Buckwalter and Turri 2015, p. 14) even 
more puzzling. As experimental philosophers, they are surely aware that such “empirical results 
cast doubt on the use of intuition as evidence for moral claims” (Tobia et al. 2013, p. 630). In 
fact, their own empirical results cast doubt on the use of “ought” judgments about unable agents 
as evidence (conclusive or not) against OIC. 
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Framing effects, order effects, and other cognitive biases undermine the evidential status 
of intuitive moral judgments because they suggest that such judgments are unreliable. As Devitt 
(2015, p. 687) puts it: 
What philosophers do think, or at least should think, is that intuitions are a source of 
evidence because they are reliable. And if they really are reliable, which does not of 
course require them to be infallible, then they are indeed a source of evidence. (And, one 
might add, this is true of any judgment, whether intuitive or not.) (emphasis in original). 
Being reliable, then, is a necessary (but perhaps not sufficient) condition for being a trustworthy 
source of evidence. As mentioned above, however, there is empirical evidence from moral 
psychology and experimental philosophy suggesting that intuitive moral judgments are biased. In 
accordance with this empirical evidence, our experimental results suggest that “ought” 
judgments exhibit an actor-observer bias. Now, biased judgments are not reliable judgments. 
Being reliable, however, is a necessary condition for being a trustworthy source of evidence. 
Since intuitive moral judgments fail to meet this necessary condition, given that they are biased, 
it follows that they cannot serve as evidence for or against philosophical theses, such as OIC. 
Again, as experimental philosophers, Buckwalter and Turri (2015) and Chituc et al. (2016) are 
surely familiar with these experimental studies about the unreliability of intuitions, which is why 
it is puzzling that they try to use intuitive moral judgments to advance so-called “powerful 
counterexamples” (Buckwalter and Turri 2015, p. 5) and so-called “empirical refutations” 
(Henne et al. 2016) against OIC.9 
In addition to the fact that “ought” judgments in particular, like intuitive moral judgments 
in general, are subject to biases and other factors that are supposed to be irrelevant from a moral 
                                               
9 For additional arguments to the effect that intuitive judgments are unreliable sources of evidence, see Mizrahi 
(2015c). 
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point of view, like an actor-observer effect, there is another, non-empirical, reason why 
Buckwalter and Turri’s (2015) talk of “powerful counterexamples” and Chituc et al.’s (2016) 
talk of “empirical refutations” are problematic. As philosophers of science since Duhem and 
Quine have pointed out, there is no such thing as an “empirical refutation.” As Quine (1951, p. 
38) elegantly puts it, “our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense 
experience not individually but only as a corporate body.” In philosophy of science, this is 
known as the Duhem-Quine thesis or confirmation holism. According to the Duhem-Quine 
thesis, when a theory makes a prediction that is not borne out by experimentation or observation, 
logic alone does not tell us whether to reject the theory or any number of auxiliary assumptions 
that were made in order to derive the prediction in the first place. As Okasha (2002, p. 306) puts 
it: 
According to the doctrine of confirmation holism, also known as the ‘Quine-Duhem’ 
thesis, the empirical content of a scientific theory cannot be parcelled out individually 
among the constituent components of the theory. Thus when a theory makes an empirical 
prediction which turns out to be false, it will not be automatically obvious where to lay 
the blame, i.e., which component of the theory to reject. Logic tells us there is an error 
somewhere in the set of statements which implies the false prediction, but does not tell us 
where. So there will be various ways of modifying our theory to inactivate the false 
implication. 
Accordingly, when prediction P of theory T is not borne out by experimentation or observation, 
we cannot simply derive the negation of T as follows: 
T  P 
~P 
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∴ ~T 
This is because, in deriving P from T, we have made some auxiliary assumptions, and P follows 
from that set of statements, namely, T and A1, A2, A3, …, An, not from T alone. So when P turns 
out to be false, all we are justified in concluding is that the conjunction T & A1 & A2 & … An is 
false, but not that T is false. That is: 
(T & A1 & A2 & A3 & … An)  P 
~P 
∴ ~( T & A1 & A2 & … An) 
To assume that one can simply “refute” a theory empirically is to presuppose some form of naive 
falsificationism (Kitcher 1982, p. 44). Since naive falsificationism is false, a “refutation” that 
presupposes it is no refutation at all (Mizrahi 2015d). 
Accordingly, when Chituc et al. (2016) set out to test OIC empirically, they explicitly 
mention some of the auxiliary assumptions they have made in order to derive the prediction that 
“can and ought judgments [should] correlate” (Chituc et al. 2016, p. 22). For instance, they 
assume that their sample of participants contains “competent speakers [of English, presumably]” 
and that these “competent speakers” are in “good epistemic conditions” (Henne et al. 2016, p. 
284).10 However, they do not explicitly mention two key auxiliary assumptions that they must 
assume in order to test OIC experimentally and conclude that OIC is not analytic. These 
auxiliary assumptions are the following: 
                                               
10 As an anonymous reviewer helpfully pointed out, it is important to note here that, like Mizrahi (2015a) and Chituc 
et al. (2016), we did not ask participants about their native language, whereas Buckwalter and Turri (2015) did ask 
participants about their native language In all of their experiments, more than 90% of participants have reported that 
English is their first language. Even though the “official language” of morality is not English, presumably, this is 
important to note because our survey materials, like those of Mizrahi (2015a), Mizrahi (2015b), Buckwalter and 
Turri (2015), and Chituc et al. (2016), use English modals for the concepts of moral obligation and ability. We think 
that it would be interesting to conduct further research in order to find out whether participants’ judgments would 
vary across different languages. 
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R: The participants’ intuitive judgments are not biased or otherwise influenced by factors 
that are irrelevant to the truth of intuitive judgments about moral obligation and ability. 
J: Making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases about morality (e.g., 
whether an agent is morally obligated to do something) is a reliable method of 
discovering the semantic properties (e.g., truth, analyticity, etc.) of philosophical 
principles (e.g., OIC). 
Their prediction that “can and ought judgments [should] correlate” (Chituc et al. 2016, p. 22), or 
that “competent speakers should deny that an agent ought to do an act when they understand that 
the agent cannot do the act” (Henne et al. 2016, p. 284), then, follows from OIC only on the 
assumption that R and J are the case. For if it were not the case that R, then the prediction that 
“competent speakers should deny that an agent ought to do an act when they understand that the 
agent cannot do the act” (Henne et al. 2016, p. 284) would not follow from the hypothesis that 
‘ought’ analytically or conceptually entails ‘can’, since the intuitive moral judgments that Chituc 
et al. (2016) were to look at in this case would be biased or influenced by factors that are 
irrelevant to the truth of judgments about moral obligation and ability (i.e., factors other than the 
truth or falsity of OIC itself), and hence untrustworthy as evidence that is supposed to amount to 
an “empirical refutation” of OIC. Similarly, if it were not the case that J, then the prediction that 
“competent speakers should deny that an agent ought to do an act when they understand that the 
agent cannot do the act” (Henne et al. 2016, p. 284) would not follow from the hypothesis that 
‘ought’ analytically or conceptually entails ‘can’, since the intuitive moral judgments that Chituc 
et al. (2016) were to look at in this case would again be unreliable, and hence untrustworthy as 
evidence that is supposed to amount to an “empirical refutation” of OIC. 
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Accordingly, with the aforementioned assumptions now made explicit, Chituc et al.’s 
(2016) so-called “empirical refutation” of OIC actually runs as follows: 
1. If ‘ought’ analytically or conceptually entails ‘can’ and R and J, then “competent 
speakers should deny that an agent ought to do an act when they understand that the agent 
cannot do the act” (Henne et al. 2016, p. 284). 
2. “Competent speakers assert that an agent ought to do an act when they understand that 
the agent cannot do the act” (Henne et al. 2016, p. 284). 
3. Therefore, it is not the case that ‘ought’ analytically or conceptually entails ‘can’ and R 
and J. 
For a conjunction to be false, only one of the conjuncts has to be false, and logic alone does not 
tell us which of the components of (3) is false. It may be the case that “‘ought’ analytically or 
conceptually entails ‘can’” is false. But it may also be the case that R is false or that J is false. 
Logic and Chituc et al.’s (2016) experimental results alone do not tell us which of the 
components of (3) is to be rejected. 
Similar remarks apply to Buckwalter and Turri’s (2015, p. 5) talk about “a powerful 
counterexample to OIC.” That is to say, when they set out to test OIC empirically, Buckwalter 
and Turri (2015) make assumptions without which they could not test OIC empirically. For 
instance, they assume that their sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers is a representative 
sample. They assume that these Amazon Mechanical Turk workers understand the meaning of 
words like ‘ought’, ‘obligation’, ‘unable’, etc. They assume that the “moral terminology” 
(Buckwalter and Turri (2015, p. 16) used in their experiments accurately tracks the concepts of 
moral obligation, ability, and the like. In other words, Buckwalter and Turri (2015) make pretty 
much the same assumptions that Chituc et al. (2016) make in order to test OIC empirically. 
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Crucially, their prediction that “moral requirements are attributed to agents independently 
of the presence of an ability to fulfill them” (Buckwalter and Turri 2015, 2), follows from OIC 
only on the assumption that R and J are the case. For if it were not the case that R, then the 
prediction that “moral requirements are attributed to agents independently of the presence of an 
ability to fulfill them” (Buckwalter and Turri 2015, 2) would not follow from “the principle that 
ought implies can” (Buckwalter and Turri 2015, p. 16), since the intuitive moral judgments that 
Buckwalter and Turri (2015) were to look at in this case would be biased or influenced by factors 
that are irrelevant to the truth of judgments about moral obligation and ability (i.e., factors other 
than the truth or falsity of OIC itself), and hence untrustworthy as evidence that is supposed to 
amount to a “powerful counterexample” to OIC. Similarly, if it were not the case that J, then the 
prediction that “moral requirements are attributed to agents independently of the presence of an 
ability to fulfill them” (Buckwalter and Turri 2015, 2) would not follow from “the principle that 
ought implies can” (Buckwalter and Turri 2015, p. 16), since the intuitive moral judgments that 
Buckwalter and Turri (2015) were to look at in this case would again be unreliable, and hence 
untrustworthy as evidence that is supposed to amount to a “powerful counterexample” to OIC. 
Accordingly, with the aforementioned assumptions now made explicit, Buckwalter and 
Turri’s (2015) attempt to empirically “disprove” OIC by “powerful counterexamples” actually 
runs as follows: 
1. If (OIC & R & J), then participants would not attribute moral obligation to unable agents. 
2. Participants attribute moral obligation to unable agents. 
3. Therefore, it is not the case that (OIC & R & J). 
Again, for a conjunction to be false, only one of the conjuncts has to be false, and logic alone 
does not tell us which of the components of (3) is false. It may be the case that OIC is false. But 
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it may also be the case that R is false or that J is false. Logic and Buckwalter and Turri’s (2015) 
experimental results alone do not tell us which of the components of (3) is to be rejected. 
In fact, our experimental results provide a reason to think that the problematic conjunct in 
both Buckwalter and Turri’s (2015) and Chituc et al.’s (2016) conclusions, i.e., (3), is R. As we 
have seen, “ought” judgments, like intuitive moral judgments in general, are subject to biases 
and other factors that are supposed to be irrelevant from a moral point of view (in particular, an 
actor-observer effect). If such intuitive moral judgments are biased, or influenced by factors that 
are irrelevant to their truth or falsity, then the reason participants judged that agents ought to 
perform an action when they can’t may have nothing to do with the truth or analyticity of OIC, 
but rather something to do with prejudices and biases. That is why Buckwalter and Turri’s 
(2015) talk of a “powerful counterexample” to OIC and Chituc et al.’s (2016) talk of an 
“empirical refutation” of OIC are not only empirically unwarranted but also methodologically 
problematic.11 
Of course, just like Mizrahi (2015a), Buckwalter and Turri (2015), and Chituc et al. 
(2016), in conducting our own experimental survey of intuitive judgments about cases of moral 
obligation (ought) and ability (can), we have also made some auxiliary assumptions as well, such 
as assumptions about the trustworthiness of Mechanical Turk workers and the reliability of 
survey procedures like the ones we have used in our study, which is why we do not claim to have 
“disproved by counterexamples” or “empirically refuted” anything. Unlike Buckwalter and Turri 
(2015) and Chituc et al. (2016), however, we did not--and need not--assume that intuitive moral 
judgments are not biased, i.e., we do not assume that R is the case, for we do not use the intuitive 
moral judgments our participants have made in response to our vignettes as evidence (either 
conclusive or defeasible) against OIC. Rather, we take the fact that our participants judged that 
                                               
11 For arguments to the effect that J is problematic, too, see Mizrahi (2015d). 
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agents who are unable to perform an action ought to perform it nonetheless as evidence that OIC 
is not intuitive. For, if OIC were intuitive, it would have seemed to our participants that an agent 
is not morally obligated to do what she cannot do.12 More explicitly, since intuitions are 
intellectual appearances or seemings (i.e., it seems to S that p), if OIC were intuitive, then it 
would have seemed to our participants that an agent ought to perform an action only if the agent 
can perform that action. The fact that our participants judged that an agent (either “Alex” or 
“You”) ought to perform an action even when the agent is unable to perform that action suggests 
that it did not seem to them that an agent ought to perform an action only if the agent can 
perform that action. In other words, to them, OIC is not intuitive. 
The key auxiliary assumptions, along with the hypotheses and predictions of the three 
experimental studies on OIC discussed above, are summed up in Table 2. 
Table 2. Hypotheses, predictions, auxiliary assumptions, and conclusions of the aforementioned 
experimental studies of OIC. 
Study Hypothesis Key 
Auxiliary 
Assumption 
Prediction Conclusion 
Mizrahi 
(2015a) 
OIC is 
intuitive 
Intuitions are 
seemings 
“we would expect people to 
judge that agents who are unable 
to perform an action are not 
morally obligated to perform 
that action” (Mizrahi 2015a, p. 
232). 
“OIC is not 
intuitive” 
(Mizrahi 2015b, 
p. 251). 
Buckwalter 
and Turri 
(2015) 
OIC is true R; J “Our primary question is 
whether perceptions of ability 
limit judgments about whether a 
broad range of moral 
requirements are present, or if 
moral requirements are 
attributed to agents 
“ought does not 
imply can” 
(Buckwalter and 
Turri 2015, p. 
14). 
                                               
12 On intuitions as intellectual appearances or seemings, see Brogaard (2014). 
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independently of the presence of 
an ability to fulfill them” 
(Buckwalter and Turri 2015, p. 
2). 
Chituc et al. 
(2016) 
OIC is 
analytic 
R; J “participants should deny that 
the agent ‘ought’ to do 
something if they learn that the 
agent can’t do it” (Chituc et al. 
2016, p. 21). 
“OIC is not true 
analytically or 
conceptually” 
(Henne et al. 
2016, p. 288). 
 
As mentioned above, all three experimental studies on OIC discussed above, as well as our own 
experimental study, share some auxiliary assumptions, such as assumptions about the reliability 
of survey procedures using Qualtrics, the trustworthiness of Mechanical Turk workers, the words 
‘ought’ and ‘can’ and the concepts of moral obligation and ability. Crucially, however, 
Buckwalter and Turri (2015) and Chituc et al. (2016) make auxiliary assumptions that Mizrahi 
(2015a) does not. As far as Buckwalter and Turri’s (2015) study goes, without assuming that 
intuitive moral judgments are unbiased and that making intuitive moral judgments in response to 
hypothetical cases about morality is a reliable method of discovering the truth or falsity of 
philosophical principles (like OIC), it would not follow that OIC is false from the fact that 
“[m]oral requirements were attributed [by participants] independently of ability,” as Buckwalter 
and Turri (2015, pp. 2-3) want to argue. As far as Chituc et al.’s (2016) study goes, without 
assuming that intuitive moral judgments are unbiased and that making intuitive judgments in 
response to hypothetical cases about morality is a reliable method of discovering the semantic 
properties (like analyticity) of philosophical principles (like OIC), it would not follow that OIC 
is not analytic from the fact that “participants readily say that an agent ought to do what they 
know the agent cannot do,” as Henne et al. (2016, p. 286) want to argue. Like Mizrahi (2015a), 
we do not need to assume R and J for our results to show that OIC is not intuitive. For we do not 
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pretend to have discovered anything about the semantic properties (i.e., truth or analyticity) of 
the meta-ethical principle OIC from intuitive moral judgments, especially since such judgments 
are biased and appealing to them as evidence is methodologically problematic. Rather, our 
results simply show that people do not find OIC intuitive. So, like Mizrahi (2015a), we only need 
to assume that intuitions are seemings. 
For these reasons, we think that the appropriate conclusion to draw from the empirical 
fact that people attribute moral obligations to agents even when those agents are unable to fulfill 
those obligations is that OIC is not intuitive, not that OIC is false or that OIC has been 
“empirically refuted.” After all, the empirical fact is about people’s intuitive judgments, whereas 
OIC is a philosophical thesis about the concepts of moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). 
The three experimental studies on OIC discussed in this paper, as well as our own study, reveal 
that people judge that agents ought to do something even when they also judge that those agents 
cannot do it. From this empirical fact about intuitive moral judgments, Buckwalter and Turri 
(2015) want to draw the conclusion that OIC is false. But this conclusion follows from that 
empirical fact only on the assumptions that intuitive judgments are unbiased and that they are 
reliable evidence for or against philosophical principles, such as OIC. Similarly, from the 
empirical fact that people judge that agents ought to do something even when they also judge 
that those agents cannot do it, Chituc et al (2016) want to draw the conclusion that OIC is not 
analytic. But, again, this conclusion follows from that empirical fact only on the assumptions that 
intuitive judgments are unbiased and that they are reliable evidence for discovering the semantic 
properties of philosophical principles, such as OIC. As experimental philosophers have pointed 
out, however, “empirical results [such as those presented in this paper and the aforementioned 
experimental studies on OIC] cast doubt on the use of intuition [e.g., intuitive judgments about 
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what agents ought to do] as evidence for [or against] moral claims” (Tobia et al.. 2013, p. 630). 
As experimental philosophers, Buckwalter, Turri, and Chituc et al. ought to know that the 
evidential status of intuitive moral judgments in response to hypothetical scenarios is 
questionable, in light of results from experimental studies. As philosophers, Buckwalter, Turri, 
and Chituc et al. ought to know that there is no such thing as an “empirical refutation,” given 
confirmation holism. Even though it has not been “refuted,” now that there is empirical evidence 
that OIC is not intuitive, OIC needs to be argued for without appealing to its alleged intuitiveness 
(Mizrahi 2015b, p. 254). 
 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper, our aim has been to contribute to the current debate about the status of OIC and the 
growing body of empirical evidence that undermines it. In accordance with previous 
experimental studies, our results show that people do judge that agents are morally obligated to 
perform an action even when they also judge that those agents cannot do it. Our results also show 
that people’s “ought” judgments (i.e., judgments about what moral agents ought to do) exhibit an 
actor-observer effect. This result should not surprise experimental philosophers and moral 
psychologists. Recent studies in moral psychology and experimental philosophy have found that 
moral judgments are subject to all sorts of biases and are influenced by factors that are supposed 
to be irrelevant from a moral point of view. Because of this actor-observer effect on people’s 
“ought” judgments, and the Duhem-Quine thesis (or confirmation holism), talk of disproving 
OIC by “powerful counterexamples,” or of an “empirical refutation” of OIC, is empirically 
unwarranted and methodologically problematic. Therefore, the correct conclusion to draw from 
the empirical fact that people attribute moral obligations to agents even when those agents are 
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unable to fulfill those moral obligations is that OIC is not intuitive, not that OIC has been 
refuted. 
Now that there is empirical evidence suggesting that OIC is not intuitive, those who are 
not willing to give up on OIC can no longer treat it as an axiom, i.e., as a principle that can be 
taken for granted as fundamental without argument. In fact, if deontic logic, like logic in general, 
is supposed to be intuitive, but OIC is not intuitive, as the aforementioned empirical evidence 
suggests, then there is a good reason to give up on OIC.13 
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